Abstract: This paper argues that there are areas of political behavior for which the usual assumption of wealth maximlzing homo economicus is to narrow to generate convincing explanation of behavior. In porticular, it is a r gued that for many political decisions, people choose according to some set of maral preconceptions while for others, people have insufficient Information to make economic choices even if they were inclined to do so. This implies that normative public choice can onl y be part of a political decision process in which non-pecuniary concerns influence choices . Finally, constitutional economics insofar as it is conceptually concelved, mu st presume some set of maral and informational properties of the parties to the social contract.
Introduction
In recent years, the subdiscipline of public choice has made dramatic inroads into the traditional fields of political science anä political philosophy. By applying a consistent model of human actlon originolly developed in order to study behavior in market settings to the study of behavior in political settings, public choice economists have to a large extent 'taken the blinders off' the way we Iook at our political Institutions . By making the simple assumption that the same kind of people act in political settings as act in markets, the field of public choice has deromanticized our view of government. We have come to see not only economic reasons behind much public behavior, but also the way in which public trusts can be and have been used for private purposes. Public choice teaches us to be skeptical of public professions of ideological mativations and apparent selfless actions. We have come to expect that in public life, people say one thing and mean another. The implication drawn. ls that good science requires us to assess what people actually do and what the consequences of th. eir actions are rather than what they say they want and what they expect will hoppen. In public life a s in market settings, saying is not be trusted. Doing is what matters.
And what do people do? The assumptlon behind positive public choice models is that indlviduols are narrow self-interested moximizers who do not restrein their self-seeking accordirig to any ideological or meral principles. This nrdel of man OS homo economicus is of Course derived from economic theory which, when properly interpreted, has generated so many frultful theories of market phenomena. The point of this paper is to argue that homo economicus is not equall y sufficient to generate fruitful theories about some important areas of the political process . While there is no question that economic science owes its success to a stylized view of human nature, it is not a lso true that the same stylized view is equally applicable to oll empirical settings nor that it allows us to say everything there is to say about human action. The position I will orgue below is that there are \ areas of political action that can only be unde~stood if one takes the moral and ideological views of the actors ·1nto account. I further argue that one cannot make any policy prescription at oll without presupposing some moral or political philosophy as the guide to the good.
The Generality of the Economic Paradigm
Economic analysis and its subset, public choice, begins with a simple and perfectly general model of hl.oman action. Indeed, it is the simplicity and the generality of the model that gives economic analysis its explanatory and its predictive edge over other sociol sciences. Economists conventionolly begin with the empirical glven that human beings, by the nature of the material world within which they live and their finite life spans, are confronted with scarcity and hence cannot have everything (or even much of) what th.ey want. Hence, humans must make choices. From t hat simple beginning, economists add empirical observations to their basic framewerk in order to try to provide satisfying accounts of why some choices are made with predictable frequency while others a r e not. In order to carry out this program, they start from the premise that indlviduals are rational or 'self-interested', but at thls Ievel of generality, oll self-interest means ls that individuals have purposes and projects which they wish to accomplish. These purposes and projects are not necessarily confined exclusively to those that will bring personal beneflt in a narrow sense. It is perfectly within the scope of the self-interest· assumption for individuals to want to improve the welfare of others rather than their own.
2 To say that individuals choose rationally among alternatives to achieve thelr purposes simply means that indi.viduals will never knowlngly sacrifice a greater end for the sake of a lesser one or will never knowingly choose a more expensive means to their end than is necessar:y. 8oth are ways of saying that rat ional action means economizing action.
The formal neoclassical statement of these assumptions is the constrained moximization formulation where individuals are modeled as moximizing their 'utilities' subject to the constraints they face. As is weil known, at this Ievel of generality, the formulation is empty of ·ony content and any real explanatory power. lt simply says that individuals choose what they choose becau se that's what they want . 'Rationality' in this context can be made consistent with any kind of action imaginable so lang as the actor is conscious and not mentally deranged.
3 We impose the rationality construct on human choices because it is the only way we can moke sense out of individual actions. lndeed, at this Ievel of generality, the rationality formulation is simply a translation of what human beings recognize and define as an explanation of a human action. To say someone acts rationally is simply to say that his choice had a recognizable purpose (von Mises 1963, 18-21) .
In order to develop predictive theories about human action, it is necessary to fill the framewerk of rationality and self-interest with content, to specify the purposes and to identify the constraints that individuals face.
The particular assumption that positive economics generally makes is that human beings hav.e a strong preference for material wealth, or rather, he kind of wealth that can be evaluated in money terms. While most people, including most economists, would recognize that the preference for money wealth is not the sole preference individuals exhibit, most people, including non-economists ·da recognize that the preference is an important one. Much of the debate between economists and those who accuse them of methodological imperialism, then, seems to revolve ·around the relative weights one observes people giving to pecuniary and non-pecuniary preferences and to what extent non -pecuniary preferences can be said to dominate individual choices.
Clearly, the hypothesis that the desire for pecu niary wealth explains ~ human action is demonstrably false. Where they have real choices, individuals are often observed to choose alternatives other than those that maximize monetary wealth. For example, we observe people choosing Ieisure over work when they have the option of working more, choosing to specialize in occupations that are financially less rewarding than real alternatives, choosing to give money away to charities, engeging in act s of kindness that either do not add to or may even detract from pecuniary wealth and a hast of other non money-wealth enhancing activities. While real hard-line advocates of the wealth maximizing hypothesis might try to argue that some of these activities are directed toward lang run wealth improvement, that approach is impossible to sustain for oll such activities.
Economists generally recognize this and argue that people observe·d to be engaged in activities that do not maximize their .money wealth are actually maximizing their subjective wealth. This, of course, brings us back to the generat formularization of self-interest and hence, as analytically precise as this may seem to say that an economic actor is maximizing subjective wealth, the fact is that saying that people maximize subjective wealth is simply another way of soying that people want many different things some of which are of a non-pecuniory nature. These non-pecuniary things might include not only leisure, but also good fellowship, Iove, social status, association with others of a like nature, o sense of rectitude or personal integrity, any one of which could dominate specific choices and falslfy . d. I 4 econom1c pre Jet ons.
Unless we have some notion of what it is that people want, we cannot devise predictlve theories of choice; we can at best share a language with which to discuss people's actions ex post. The positive economlst who assumes pecuniary wealth moximization to explaln action knows thls and is moking an empirical generalization that need not be totally descriptively accurate to moke his point. lt need only be 'good enough'. The polnt of this paper is simply that this particular empirical generalization is less likely to be fruitful for genuine explanations of events when applied to political action than when it is applied to market activity. There are two reasons I have to offer for this assertlon. The first is that in political action more than in morket action, people's values and ideas of what constitute the good society enter lnto their choices. The second reason is that in analyzing and describing politlcal choice, the application of the model of deliberative rational choice itself becomes problemotic. Citlzens have limited and faulty Information obout the consequences of politlcal choices ond hence often have no idea whot would constitute o rational decision even if they were disposed to moke one.
In order to discuss the first cloim, that moral ond ideological beliefs influence politlcal cholce, we must first consider how to occount for notions of morolity in ou r s tan dard madel of human behavior. Homo economicu s, br'?odly conceived, has prefer ences ond ls llmited by constroints. To whlch category do we relegate moral volues: to preferences or const rolnts? The answer to thls question has implicotions for the kinds of publlc cholce models one con fruitfully construct.
Conslder the following situation: Two men ore engaged in o heated argument. They hurl Insults ot eoch other until 'it seems inevitable that they will come to blows. One of the men, however, with greot effort, controls his temper and wolks away from the confrontotion. In the longuage of revealed preference, the economist might soy that obvlously, the man who walked away preferred to give up rather than to fight. While on one Ievel that is correct, on another Ievel, it violotes conventionol discourse to describe the situation in that woy. The man hirnself might cloim that he really preferred to fight, but he knew that was wrang ond so could not permit hirnself the luxury of punching his opponent. In the first instonce, we describe the morol behavior in terms of preferences, while in the second, the morol conviction ls o constraint on behovior. lt seems more in concert · with conventional language to accept the second characterization where the moral code is a constroint on behavior, but to do this means the observer must believe the participant's verbal account of his behavior rather than rely ing only on observation clone, something positive economists are reluctant to do. Treating morals as rules thot constrain behavior, then, must of necessity place us outside of the positive economists' world right from the beginning.
If people conduct themselves according to rules of personal behovior to which they ascribe moral weight so that following these rules may result in short ierm sub-optimal choices, clearly it ·is not descriptively accurate to madel them as narrow pecu niory maximizers in any settlng. However, the descriptive inaccuracy is more pronounced, it seems to me, in modeling political action than in modeling merket action. Morkets are u seful to actors precisely because they aid people in enhancing_ their material wealth. The polity, on the other hand, is valued by individuals for other reasons as weil. Public choice emphasizes the Hobbesian aspects of the stete, the delegation of authority to create the order that makes wealth possible. The stete also seems to many people to be symbolic of shared values and shared notions of the good life. Since political action is as much concerned with establishing the rules by which citizens will live as with the exploiting of the rules for one's own •benefit, it seems obvious that people will choose rules at least partly for their moral content. If this is so, then politics cannot be successfully modeled purely as economics.
Economic Man and Political Choices
One obvious orea in which narrow economic analysis hos failed to provide an inteFesting explanotion of political behavior is the analysis of voting behavior. lt is a well-known irony that public choice theory, the theory of how public goods are demanded, produced and allocated in a democratic society, cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of why people vote. 5 Economic theory predicts that since the likelihood of any one person's vote influencing the outcome of an election is almest infinitesimal, os long as there ore ony costs ot oll associated with voting, it is irrational for an individual to vote. Yet we commonly observe individuals turning out to vote in huge numbers in national election~. Why?
The fact is, the paradox is only o paradox if one insists on looking at voting os an oct of choice among real alternatives open to the individual the purpese of which is wealth maximization. Few citizens seriously believe that his/her vote will decide an election, yet people vote nevertheless. Common explonotion in the Iiterature oll must move outside of the model of pecuniary odvontage to provide an explanation. Buchenon and Brennen, for exomple, compa· re voting to a kind of consumption activity like rooting for o sports tecm (Brennon/Bucnonon 1984). lt is also possible tnot people vote becouse t hey hove o sense of civic respons ibility thot only ollows them to opprove of t heir own behovior if they toke the time to vote. They vote ot scme irrmediate cost to themselves not becouse it is an oct of consumption but becouse their internolized set of marol constroints makes voting scmet hing thot is not o matter of immediate choice. They provide evidence to themselves ond to their peers thot they ore 'good' citlzens. 6
Whotever the explonotion, the oct of votlng con only be exploined b y some oppeol to non-pecunior y volues. One con think of other exomples of clvlc behovior thot do not fit the normal colculus; for example, volunteering for t he ormy in war time, and carrying litter to o litter basket rather than dropping it on t he ground are two thot ronge frcm the drcmotic to the mundane.
This is not to orgue that the economists' cost benefit colculotions ore irrelevant to the individual's political octs. At t he margin, one would expect to observe les s of t he behavior in question when the costs ore hlghe r than when tney are lower. For example, election tur n-outs are higher in good weather than on rainy days, enlistments are highe r when tne threat of tne droft is mare imminent and mare litter ends up in baskets on beocnes wh en the baskets ore placed at convenlent intervals. 7 However, the overoge amount of such behavior is largely a function of the marol volues o nd ideologies of the actors. lt is alway s in one sense 'irrational' to hold lltter for the lltter basket when rotionallty means maxumztng pecuniory ad von toge (see the a r ticle by Vanberg/Buchanan in this issue). Cleorly however, that is not the sum total of what mativates human action .
The positive public choice economist might counter that in economic theory, it is margins, not averages tnat count . Even though individuols cloim to hold volues that do not moximize their pecuniary wealth, the foct ls thot at the moment of c hoice, tne madel of pecu niary maximizotion wlll predict behavior better t han any other. Hence, it mokes scientific sense to ignore non-pecuniory interest. This is, of cou r se, an empirical question, but there is ot least scme evidence thot exists in the Iiterature to support the a priori oppealing notion that ideology or non-pecuniar y volues do cou nt in the woy people vote (Rubin/Kau 1979) . l ndeed, there are good reosons why individuols could not even formulote an opinion about the relative merits of var ious condidotes in an election without scme set of mar al presuppositions to guide them.
I am not disputing that pecuniary wealtn moximization is .2. goal of individ uals acting in a political setting. Tnot is , I am not a rguing that public cnolce nas mlssed the boat entirely. It seems perfectly appropriate to madel individuals as wealt h moximizers within o system of established rules. Hence, positive public choice madels are useful for exploinlng such things as lobbying behavior and productlvity and Iabor r elotions in o bureaucracy, for exomple. However, when it ccmes to madeling the woy in which individuals choose their rules, (and their representatives) or how the basic structure of a political society is developed, positive public choice is simply inadequate. There are other goals besides pecuniary wealth maximization which people expec.t the political system to provide for them and these goals ·affect behavior and outcomes.
Ideology and Public Choice
My secend claim was that for some political choices that individuals make, the application of a deliberative choice model is probably inadequate because choosers have very little informotion upon which to base a deliberate choice. Political ideologies and, on a mare immediate Ievel, political parties seem to be the natural implication of the limited information and the radical uncertainty faced by voters in a democracy.
There are obviously many political decisions individuals must make for which· they have very poor information, or where they would be unable to calculate their self-interest even if they had good Information. For instance,. are the interests of world peace served by the Star .Wars defense system currently advocated by the Reagan administration? If in principle, interests are served, is the system technologically feasible and is it worth to cost? Does the public debt have important consequences and if so, is it better to reduce the debt by -increasing taxes or reducing spending? Both these questions are examples of · problems where the 'experts' do not agree on even the theoretical Ievel of the problem. Clearly, the non-expert citizen is totally incapable of making a correct decision on the merits of any proposal that requires his consent. lt is even more unlikely that the citizen could take a position on these question that reflected his pecuniary self-interest in the matter. What, then, is the citizen to do?
In markets, where information is poor and difficult to obtain, entrepreneurs have a financial incentive to provide that information. Competition amang entrepreneurs insures that where accurate information is possible, accurate informotion is generated and made available to an otherwise ignorant public. Or perhops it would be better to say that the merket process of competition allows consumers to discover the information relevant to their own needs. In political settings, however, the kind of Information that people need in order to make intelligent decisions is often the kind that no one knows even in principle . . Individuals must not only assess what public goods it is in their interest to demend (a far more difficult problern than assessing what kind of car one should buy), they must also determine which elected represe ntative will best serve their purposes and what the consequences of present legislation is likely to be for their own future welfare.
While there ore plenty of political entrepreneurs willing to offer voters their opinions on the answers to these complex questions, there is no effective testing process in politics to weed out errors and incorrect Information comparable to the competition in markets. Political entrepreneurs supply individuals with what they think they want, but what they think they want may have very little resemblance to what they would want if they were correctly informed . Since on many of these issues, Information is only in the form of untested theories, voters ore led to economize on this very difficult decision process by adopting a political ideology to aid them in their choices. Even if the public choice theorist were to assume that men are solely pecuniary wealth maximizers, he could not hope to understand the political decision process without understanding the Information individuals ascribe to· their ideologies.
Achieving this understanding is no easy task. Political ideologies usually consist of statements of broad values (iike "political equality is a good thing", or "people shouldn't be poor") and of theories about how those values can be accomplished (like "allowing eighteen year olds to vote will promote equality and redistribution of income will reduce poverty"). Actual political party platforms, on the other hand, ore imperfect translations of those values and theories into specific sets of policies that may or may not be either internally consistent or empirically warkable. What people think the ideological and practical implications of a party plotform are may be different from what they really ore. The public choice theorist has generally conducted his analysis of public policy by first applying his theory to calculate the policy's consequences and then assuming that those who support the policy understand the consequences and have a pecuniary interest in them even if the predicted consequences are different from those supporters claim they will be· . 8 They tacitly assume that anyone who supports the policy for non wealth maximizing reasons is lying in order to conceal his potential gain from others. While this may often be the case, it may also be the case either that policy advocates simply do not understand the wealth implications as weil as the public choice theorist understands them, or it may simply be the case that advocates of a particular policy su pport it for non maney wealth maxmuzmg reasons. Their reasons for supporting a particular policy may simply be what they claim them to be.
For example, assume that it is calculated that a bill to subsidize higher education will increase the expected incomes of college teachers and redistribute wealth to the middle dass . From this the public choice theorist might try to predict the disposition of the bill according to the size and political clout of the coalition. Note that there ore two parts to this formulation, an explanatory and a predictive. lf the public choice economist ignores ideology where ideology happens to be important to making a decision, he will construct a madel that provides an inaccurate explanation of events even if the predictions of the model hold -which moy or moy not be the case.
First of oll, it may be the case that many higher educators genuinely believe that it ls appropriate national policy to provide higher education to anyone regardless of ability to pay and do not understand the redistributive consequences of their actions. Or they may understand them but thlnk, nevertheless, the consequences are fai r . While the educators may be beneficiaries of the bill also, lt ls simply not accurate to explain their actions solely in terms of the pecunlary income they can expect as a consequence. Secondly, voters may also believe that higher education should be subsidized regardless of the fact that university faculty and middle dass fomilies with children benefit disproportionately. They may fully believe t hat the importance of widespread occess to higher educotion supercedes any redlstributive consequences. 9
The public choice theorist might argue that whether or not he is carrect in the motives he ascrlbes to individual actors, the predictive power of hls model ls nevertheless protected. The foct is that regardless of what people soy, ot the margln, pecuniary self-interest ls a good predictor of resource allocatlon. Yet, if for some goods, either because Information is so incomplete or non-pecuniary values are so important, people choose according to ideologicol considerotions rother thon self-interest, the strict opplicatlon of homo economicus can only be correct by occident. The foct is, there ore olwoys people who support public meosures even when they don't gain; 10 even, in foct, when they personally may stand to lose.
Consider, ogain, the widespread support for public educotion. lt is of course true thot most voters believe they ond their children will be better off financially lf the cost of educotion can be spread to oll tox -poyers rather than borne by themselves olone. But the demand for public educotlon seems also hove another component to it that is far more prevalent in politicol decisions thon in market choices; that is, o deslre to affect the woy others behove. A typical orgument for public educotion is thot society ls 'better' if more people ore literote ond educoted. He re, 'better' meons not only weolthier, but also more stoble and better governed. While, I suppose 'more stoble' and 'better governed' could be tronsloted into 'weolthier ' os weil, I belleve the sense of the orgument has more to do with the kinds of people with which one wants to live. The non-pecuniory volue of having others behave in certoin ways is very important to pollticol choices. Cleorly such values are self-interested, but only in the tautologicol sense in which oll values ore held by o self. Polltics ls largely obout creating a soclety of shared volues and establishing a set of shored behaviors. In pollticol soclety, 'utility' is a functlon of the behovior of others as weil os of one's meosuroble weolth . Economists sometimes coll the demond for shared values ond shared behaviors "meddle-some preferences" (Sen 1970 ), but thls seems to miss the centrot polnt of humon culture. We ore interested in eoch other's behovior becouse thot is how we define ond judge ourselves. The simple norrow madel of homo economicus connot do justice to this importont chorocteristlc of humon belngs.
Efficiency ond Sociol Institutions
One may gront thot individual human belngs oct occording to mony volues some of which ore not self-interested in the norrow sense, ond still orgue thot positive economic onolysis provldes the best tools for exploining sociol phenomeno including politicol instltutions. One orgument thot hos been made ls thot the outcomes of sociol oction do not depend so much on the ends thot human beings pursue os on the constroints they foce. ln this view, lorgely ossocioted with the Chicogo School olthough not limited to it, no matter whot individuols hold os marol beliefs ond no matter whot kinds of non -pecuniory goods they moy choose in the short run, in the long run the only thing thot explolns soclol chonge ore chonges in relative prices brought obout by shlfts in constroints. The implicotion is thot the only economic, politicol ond sociol Institutions thot will survive ore those thot moximize the pecuniory weolth of the populotion (or some lmportont segment thereof?). ln soying this, I om creoting something of o strow mon since it is difficult to find ony one economist who will hold to thls line without wovering. As we hove noted obove, mast economists orgue thot men moximize utility, not pecuniory weolth. However, utility is not o useful concept for positive economics unless we ore oble to speclfy the orguments in the utility function. Those economists who postulote moteriol weolth os the moximand ot least ore soylng mare thon people try to get the mast of whot they wont. WJ:!ot this orgument seems to soy is thot no matter whot they think they wont, whot they get is maxlmum pecunlory weolth since oction thot Ieads to thot porticulor end will be differentlolly reworded in o competitive struggle (for exomple, see North/Thomos 1973).
Such 'survivolist' orguments borrow the longuoge of evolutionory biology ond Interpret sociol Institutions os the result of some form of competltion in whlch only the fittest or mast efficient con survive. Any ottempt to exploin o phenomenon in e volutionory terms mu st however, describe o process by which competing elements ore selected ond inefficiencies weeded out. For sociol lnstitutions, lt would be importont to exploin how innovative sociol orrongements ore introduced ond how humons oct to select omang these Institutions either consciously or unconsciously. ln the orgument under conslderotion, there is some vogue notion thot sociol Institutions compete much in the some woy thot firms compete, ond hence efficient Institutions will drive out inefficient ones in the competitive struggle. But whot ls on efficient Institution? lt is toutologlcolly true thot in evolutionory explonotions 1 the efficient survive1 but only becouse surv ivol is the definition of efficiency. One mlght opply the scme reosoning to sociol Institutions but only with some difficulty. For instonce 1 the sociol scientist could observe whot Institutions ond societies hove in foct survived competltlon ond then seorch for explonotions for why the survivors ore adaptive to their environment. Those who hold thot only efficient sociol Institutions con survive moy hypothesize thot weolth moxlmizotion is the mojor explonotory variable in lnstitutionol survivol. In t hot cose1 it would be imperative for the theorist to speclfy how he deflnes weolth ond then to describe o process by which moximizlng this definitlon of weolth Ieads Institutions to survive before the profositlon is tested. So for 1 no one hos ottempted to follow such o procedure. 1
Discussion of the efficiency of economic Institutions whose mojor purpose is to ollow individuols to improve their economic well-being ot least mokes some intuitive sense becouse we hove o theory thot ollows us to define whot constltutes an efficient economic Institution (it ollows individual octors to effect more tronsoctions ot lower cost thon wlthout it) ond to describe o process by which efficient Institutions survive ond others fall ( those Institutions llke business firms thot ore profitable sur vive while those thot moke Iosses foil). More inclusive Institutions llke o bonkin g system or o stock exchonge 1 thot is Institutions thot consist of regulorized trodlng orrongements 1 survive thot improve t he profits of the individuols who use it for their own purposes. In either case 1 the foct thot individuols who choose to portlcipote in the Institution hove purposes they wish to sotisfy ond hove o cleor meosure 1 profit 1 by which to judge whether or not t he Institution is serving their needs 1 ollows us to describe o process by which efficient Institutions con envolve. An evolutlonory opprooch to t he s tudy of economic institutions 1 t hen 1 moy prove fruitful becouse we con hypothesize o recognizoble gool ond describe o process by which efficient In stitutions ore selected by the competitlon omong self-interested human octors. However 1 when one ottempts to describe an economic process by which other forms of sociol Institutions ore selected 1 the problern is not neorly so cleor cut.
Whot is an efflclent politicol orgonizotion? If we wish to be consistent with our notion of economic efficiency 1 then it must in some woy reduce the costs of individuols pursuing t heir own interests (os 1 for exomple 1 Hobbes ond Locke exploined the reoson for government) . Cleorly 1 we con see how some politicol orgonizotion moy be better thon no politicol orgonizotion 1 but this is not the some thing os orguing thot the most efficient politlcol orgonizotion from the perspective of the weolth moximizing octivities of individual cltlzens necessorily is the one thot will survive international competitlon. An evolutionol theory of pollticol orgonizotion might sto rt f rom the hypothesls thot those politicol orgonlzotion thot con commond the greotest number of resources in times of stress ore the most efficient ond hence most likely to survive politicol competition. This seems o reosonoble empiricol hypothesis but it does not hove ony reodily opporent connection to the weolth moximizing octions of individuols. And it certoinly does not imply thot individuols connot successfully p ursue other gools besides pecuniory weolth moximizotion. The co urse of human events hos been altered more thon once by the ideos ond volues of individuols who were not pursuing either individual or national material weolth. 12
Politicol orgonizotions ore systems of power •OS weil os economic resources. A successful polity probobly depends os much on variables such os intelligent militory strotegy 1 willingness to woge defensive wars 1 conniness of Ieaders in world ond domestic offoirs 1 o sense of national purpose bosed an shored vo lues 1 ond o hast of other intongibles thot connot be odequotely .proxied by meosures of weolth. Given the wide voriety of relotively long -lived politicol institutions of oll different shopes ond sizes 1 it seems cleor thot weolth moximizotion olone cannot occount for the survivol of oll of them.
Public Choice 1 Public Policy 1 ond the Choice of Institutions
So for 1 this poper hos been concerned with ·the limitotions of the norrow homo economicus ossumption for positive public choice 1 the economic theory of individual politicol behovior. Now we turn to the difficulties ossocioted with ossuming norrow homo economicus in normative publit ·choice 1 · the exer cise of divising politicol institutionol rules ·ta improve the woy thot government functions t o serve··the purposes of its citizenry. 13 · Normative public choice begihs ' with the ossum·ption thot insof<ir os individuols wont government •tO' provide public goods 1 t he public choice economist is in o position to design institutionol rules to help them ochieve their purposes more efficiently. I rother coll this octivity 'prescriptive' public choice since it prescribes methods for ochieving given gools; it is not strictly positive science since it does not ottempt simply to onolyze and exploin whot is 1 nor is it normative policy since it does not explore gools or volues nor does it choose omong them. It does 1 however 1 presuppose the norm thot using fewer resources to ochieve one's gool is better thon using more.
One method by which to engoge in prescriptive public choice is to apply a simple colculus of benefits ond costs to oll public policies 1 and to ottempt to des~n r ules ond procedures thot moximize the rotio of benefits to costs.
1 The colculotions ore mode in money terms ·ond non-morket volues ore given money proxies. The presumption in this exercise is thot oll preferences count equolly ond thot oll consequences con be effectively meosu red in money terms. So, for exomple, if it would hove been eheaper to buy up oll the sloves in the ontebell'um · South ond monumit them thon to fight the civll war, prescriptive policy would hove argued for the former cou r se of oction.
There is much merit in this opprooch ·to public policy. It provides some framewerk for comporing the consequences of alternative palides ond some rough ond ' ready meosure of the mognitudes of those consequences. Calculoting the potential costs of o war ond then figuring out how much you could poy the opposing soldiers not to fight ot least gives the citizenry some bosis upon which to judge the degree to which they believe the war is in their national interests. lt might even open up o debote on possible pebceful alternatives. If one v"iews the public policy economist's (er the prescriptive public choice theorist's) role os affering some meosure of the relative costs of vorious policies, cost-benefit onolysis is useful ond importont. However, given the multiplicity of volues people hold os citizens, it should not be surprising if the so-called 'efficient' policy is not followed. Whot is efficient in terrris of money ·calculotions moy not be efficient in terms of the non-pecuniory · gools individuols os citizens hold.
When it comes to designing politicol institutions, however, the cost/benefit approoch to prescrfptive policy connot even in principle be opplied. To soy something is efficient implies thot one is judging it occording to some end one hos in view. We hove olreody orgued thot the gool of politicol institutions is not limited to promoting weolth moximizotion of the citizens of a polity even in the eyes of the citizens themselves. Hence opplying o rational colculus to devising, soy, voting rules or distributions of rights is meoningful only in a very generol sense. Certoinly, o rational colculus bosed on pecuniory weolth maximizotion could eosily Iead to the development of rules thot conflict with individuols' notions of foirness or rights.
Consider, for · exomple, the controversy · surrounding the Coose theorem. Coose showed thot in any conflict of externolities thot is to be set tled by specifying property rights, who gets the right to the property in question is irrelevant from the per spective of efficiency. Regordless of who gets the right to use the hitherto corrmon resource, the . person who con moke most efficient use of it (thot is, generote the most morket incorr:e from its use) will end up with it so Ieng os the property is t radeoble in the morket. Cleody, however, eveh if the terms of the settlement of the property right ore irrelevant to the eventual emergence of efficient use of the resource, it is not irrelevoht in terms of rights. It is not legitimote to infer from the Coose theorem thot moximizing merket volue is the only -or even the most importont -considerotion in solving disputes over property ( Coose 1960) .
Efficiency is an end-state notion. lt implles that the desired outcome should be orrived ot in the cheapest possible woy. lt also implles thot the ends ond the meons ta ochieving them ore known to the decision moker. The rules of politicol society, on the other hod, are process notlons. Port of the 'end' that is desired is a woy of living and o woy of doing things. The rules of sociol order are important preclsely because there is no one ogreed upon set of ends for the society os o whole thot ore to be moximized nar ore the full consequences of rules known ot the time of odoptlon. Hence the term "efficient rules" would seem to be an oxymoron -thot is, self-cantrodictory. 15
It is the difficulties with the conventionol notions of efficiency t hat motivotes Jomes Buchanan's contractarian approoch to government or "constitutionol eoonomics". 16 Buchanan's contractorion model is portly prescriptive in notu re, olthough it is different from the uncomplicoted utilitorionism of cost /benefit onolysis. Generolizing from subjectivist insights into the choice process, Buchanan reolizes that individual evoluotions of alte rnatives ore olwoys subjective ond thot money equivolents con't olwoys r eflect indivld ual s u bjecti ve evoluotions. Con seq uentl y, Buchonon arg ues thot the only test of the efficiency of elther immediate policies or of more long run institutionol -in his case, constitutional -rules is the agreement of porticiponts in the Institution. This ls a generolizotion from the subjectivists' inslght thot the only evidence we hove of the goins from trode is that the trade was entered into voluntorily ( Buchonon 1985o).
Buchonon recognizes that for the exercise of prescr iptive public choice especially at the const itutionol Ievel, the simple calculation of money goins ond Iosses moy not be a good guide to the kinds of policies and rules to which a collection of individuols will agree. So, for instonce, in the cose of the civil war, Buchonon's opprooch can occomodote the foct thot Southerners ond Northerners both sow volues like morol rectitude, regional outonomy ond ingroined Iife-styles ot stake, ond o policy of 'buying out the opposition' would have been unocceptoble to either side. This is not to say thot ot the Ievel of irrmediate policy, colculoting benefits and costs in money terms is not o useful exer cise to aid decision moking. lndeed, it moy be the only way for decision mokers to understand t he trode-off s lnvolved in some policies. However, ot the Ievel of constitutionol design, the Ievel of deciding what octions ore permissible ond impermissible to the state ond to individuals, t he simple colculotion of money benefits ond costs is impossible. lt begs oll the questions of mine ond thine thot must be onswered before money volues have meoning.
Buchonon's alternative to the utilltarian brand of prescriptfve publlc choice is to ottempt to devise constitutional rules thot might commond agreement if octually put to the test. The rules he proposes ore long ronge constitutional rules where colculotion of immediate gains ond Iosses to individuols is difficult, but where procedures for moking decisions ond limitotions on government power con be ogreed to bec9use of the uncertointy eoch person foces obout his own position in the future. Since Buchonon does not belleve there is o spontaneaus order by which politicol processes Iead to unintended beneficiol outcomes for citizens, his controctorionism is o woy of designing constitutions thot p r ovide the benefits thot spontaneaus processes generote in market settings. The constitutio nol controctorion serves o useful role in this politicol process specificolly becou se there is no benevolent spontaneaus order; there ore no processes by which Information obout the chorocteristics ond consequences of constitutions con be generoted in order for individuols to moke informed choices, nor is there o process by which on onolysis of the unintended consequences of individual octions Ieads to the discovery of this Information in an unombiguous monner. The constitutionol-controctorion, then, hirnself serves os o politicol entrepreneur who 'discovers' Information obout constitutions ond, hoving discovered the Information, is in o position to serve os o politicol b roker affe ri ng potential borgoins untll the rig ht one is struck omong politicol troders. Given the foct thot the constitutionol broker does not know the preference functions of individual portles to the borgoln, he only knows if he hos hit on an efficient trode if the borgoin is in foct made.
At this Ievel, Buchonon provides the prescriptive public choice theorist with o roJe to ploy in public policy formation thot hos its justiflcotion in o Information foilure in the politicol process. It is procticol in thls exercise (ond not misleoding) to use the homo economicus construct os o first opproximation to orrive ot potential politicol borgoins since octuol human beings will be decidlng just how close to the mork the proffered borgoin is to their own volue s t ructure. At onother Ievel of obstroction, howeve r , Buchonon's controctorionism moves out of the ronge of prescrlptive public choice ond into the reolm of normative politicol philosophy. At this Ievel, homo economicus is not neorly so benign an ossumption to make. We orrive ot this Ievel th rough the discussions of the conceptuol controct.
Buchonon orgues thot becouse it is impossible to octuolly put constit utionol rules to the test of octuol ogreement, the constltutionol politicol economist must devise constltutions thot could in principle commond unonimous ogreement omong those who will be governed by the constitution. He storts from the normative premise fomilior to economists thot only individuols count ond thot oll individuols count equolly regordless of their preferences (or morol volues or personal chorocters?), ond thot the only morol bosis for o pollticol society is ogreement. However, since we don't hove octuol emplrlcol tests of ogreement to legitimize governments, we must model those humons who might porticipote in the sociol controct in order to theorize obout the kind of government upon which they might be oble to ogree.
The only legitimate governments ore governments upon which real human beings would be oble to ogree. Notice thot the rr.orol presuppositions of this opprooch ore minimal, but s trong. ·Jndivlduol volues ore not to be questioned. All individuols must count equolly in the controct, negotiotion is the only legitimate process ond ogreement the only woy to legitimize on outcome.
Since the conceptuol controct is never put to the market test, yet is intended to serve os o meons of judging existing or potential constltutions, the chorocteristics of the people one presumes ore porty to the controct is importont. lf we begin with the subjectivist ossumption thot no one but the individual hirnself con know his utility function, then finding the oppropriote model of the human beings who ore o porty to the controct con be problematic. Buchenon solves this problern by peopling his sociol controct with beings thot Iook remarkobly like homo economicus. Buchonon's controctors oll hove different tostes ond different endowments to begin with, but the long run nature of constitutionol rules tends to mute these differences os the consequences of odopted rules ore only reolized in the future. More signiflcont ore the chorocteristics they oll hove in common. They ore oll rational, adult, mentolly competent, ond concerned exclusively with their material well-being. More significontly, they know everything the economist knows obout the functioning of society. Even mare importontly, they hove no interest in the behovior of others except insofor os it directly offects their own pecuniory interests. They ore not real people but ideal types who copture the essence of rational , economic mon.
We hove olreody orgued thot norrow economic man is descriptively incorrect ond onolyticolly too restrictive o concept to judge economic policy. Certoinly, it is even more off the mark to model men in this norrow woy for the purpose of devising conceptual contracts. By definition, the conceptual contract ls conceptual because the contract cannot in fact be put to the test. Hence, it is oll the more importont to toke seriously the subjectivist presumptian thot people not only have different tostes ond preferences, but also different marol beliefs and different ideologies. People think differently obout the world.
To model men in the conceptual contract as strictly h6mo economicus either presumes that that ls in fact the best description of human beings or it implies thot thot is the way men should behove. We hove olreody orgued that the first alternative is incorrect. lt is doubtful that ony contractorian would want to subscribe to the second alternative. Hence, unless we want to ossume thot some rational ethic con be built into the social contract 17 which puts us further away from a real controct ond blunts the lndividuolity of persons even more thon the fictionol sociol controct normally does, we must assume something obout the moral philosophies thot these rational beings will bring to their bargaining. Otherwise it is impossible to come up with criteria by which ta judge existing or potential contracts in the absence of actual agreements. The contractarian who takes individuals as the source of oll values, I think, must logically take individuals as the source of information about values as well . This implies that maral presuppositions must be assumed to be part of the package that individuals bring to the social contract. This, of cou r se, makes the roJe of the contractorion philosopher far mare difficult than that of the contractarian economist. lf the requirements of the differing maral systems must be added to the caiculations of the different alternative rules in order to have some rational basis for judging their efficiency in the absence of actual agreement, how do we deal with conflicting maral systems?
The contractarian position is that oll individuals who are a party to the contract must be counted equally in arriving at the rules of the game. Yet, there may be some cases involving the definition of corrmon standards of behavior (cis for example, whether or not abortion is legitimate) where coming· to agree!fle'nt may be almest impossible. 18 One also must question whether oll moral beliefs, no matter how repugnant to other members of the comTounity, must be counted equally. Should the beliefs of the primitive tribesman who takes it as religious dogma that infant girls should be sexually mutilated corrmand the same respect in the social contract as the beliefs of those who oppose the practice simply because both want to live in the same political order? While a large degree of maral relativism is necessary in a pluralistic society, it is not clear that a philosophical contractarian can be totally agnostic on the question of whidi maral values count.
Conclusion
This paper has been concerned with the Iimits of the narrow madel of homo economicus that ignores the roJe of maral rules and ideological cOmToitments in the actions of human beings. The recent fashion in economics is to extend the model of homa economicus into other fields besides economics, to engage in a proud kind of economic imperialism. In general, there is something to be gained from this adventure, especially in those fields like political science and sociology where the effects of narrow economic calculation had hi.therto been completely ignore. d. However, this essay is offered as a cautionary tale to those crusaders of the economics faith who long to spread the Word · into oll corners of the intellectual world. The economists madel d9e·s not translote perfectly into other langvages or other cultures, and to f~il to recognize the truth of this observation can Iead to ,a total misperception of the phenomenon under consideration. In the specific case of the analysis of political activity, the economists has made great gains in understanding the way in which special interests can use the political process to gain an advantage. But to say that this is the only useful way of understqnding t he politicol process is in ltself an ideological position thot would corrmand little ogreement crnong porticiponts in the intellectuol debate.
1.
This is an extreme version of what economists seem to believe. Very few would actuolly odhere to such o hord line if they were forced to do so explicitly, but the argument is implicit in the way in which some economlsts dismiss the investlgotions of oll other disciplines such OS philosophy or sociology with 0 contemptuous wove of t he hand. In the typicol lunch time conversation omong 'hard nosed' economlsts, the typicol attitude suggests thot only economic self-interest is important In explonation -or oppropriote personal behavior.
2.
Ki r zner 1963, 5. Kirzner's formu lotion follows von Mises' view of o man as a purposeful onlmal, and it is far superior to the mare stondord self-lnterest formu lotion since it implies nothing about the content of lnterests. People may or moy not be selfish 1 but they do have ends or purposes for which they will choose omong alternative meons. Jock Wi seman prefers to model men as making plons that ore subject to revision thereby lncluding the notion of time and learning in human action. See Wlseman 1983 1 18-20.
3.
Gory Becker 1 for instonce 1 hos modeled altruistic behovior withln fomilles by ossuming thot individual utility functions depend in port on the utility of other fomlly members. See Becker 1981.
4.
Merely including such arguments in individual utility functions does not eliminote the possibility of economic explanation in the brood sense since one can still wont mare or less of these values ot different 'prices' 1 but it does suggest that a convention empirical economics of 1 say 1 Iove or duty will be problematic since act performed for the soke of Iove or duty moy not be omenoble to onolysis with maney proxies.
5.
For a brief summary of orguments on the paradox of voting 1 see Mueller 1979 1 120-123. 6. It might be argued thot both rooting for a teom and exerclslng one's 'clvic respons i bility' are just two forms of consumption. However 1 it ls at least likely that they ore fundomentally different forms of behovlor in that the individuols behove differently in response to changes in incentives. While o marginal increase in the price of votlng from 1 say 1 rain or distonce from the polls will normall y reduce voter turn out in an election1 an increose in the price of voting from pollticol repression or violent confrontotion has induced some people to increose rother than decreose their voting behovior. lnsofar as voting is considered a right of citizenship, ottempts to thwart its exercise can Iead to more rather than less assertion of thot right.
